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Molly and the Crack House Statute: 
Vulnerabilities of a Recuperating Music 
Industry 
Jacob A. Epstein* 
The normalcy of “club drug” use in today’s live music culture 
makes concert promoters and venue managers particularly 
vulnerable to prosecution under the “crack-house statute,” 21 
U.S.C. § 856. Section 856(a)(2) makes it illegal for a promoter 
or venue manager to “manage any place . . . and knowingly and 
intentionally . . . profit from, or make available for use . . . the 
place for the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing, 
distributing, or using a controlled substance.” In United States 
v. Tebeau, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that third 
parties could satisfy the statute’s “intent” requirement. This 
Note examines the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation and the 
uncertainty that it has created, which may lead to a situation 
where any promoter involved in any event where illegal drugs 
are consumed can be held liable under Section 856. This Note 
calls for an amendment to the statute, better designed (1) to curb 
dangerous club drug use, (2) to provide health and safety 
measures for patrons, and (3) to punish, specifically, rogue 
concert promoters who facilitate such dangerous situations, so 
that the many positive economic effects of the live music sector 
may continue to flourish. 
I.   INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 96 
II. SETTING THE STAGE .................................................................. 98 
                                                                                                             
 *  Managing Editor, University of Miami Business Law Review; Juris Doctor 
Candidate 2015, University of Miami School of Law. Bachelor of Arts in Sociology & 
Anthropology 2010, Colgate University. A big thank you to Professor Annette Torres for 
your excellent feedback and advice throughout this process and to the entire University of 
Miami Business Law Review editorial board for all of your hard work. This Note is 
dedicated to my incredible family and friends who support me in everything I do; your 
encouragement and genuine interest in my work made this possible. 
96 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:95 
 
A. The Trend Toward More Music Festivals Is Significant............ 98 
B. This Trend is Beneficial and Should Be Encouraged. ............. 100 
C. The Pervasiveness of Drug Use at Music Festivals Is 
Substantial. .............................................................................. 101 
III. THE CRACK HOUSE STATUTE ................................................ 102 
A. The Substance and Purpose of the Original Crack House 
Statute ...................................................................................... 102 
B. The 2003 Amendment to the Crack House Statute ................... 103 
C. The Purpose of the 2003 Amendment to the Crack House 
Statute ...................................................................................... 105 
IV. UNITED STATES V. TEBEAU .................................................... 107 
A. Introduction ............................................................................. 107 
B. Facts and Procedural History of United States v. Tebeau ...... 108 
C. Tebeau’s Textual Argument ..................................................... 109 
D. Tebeau’s Procedural Argument ............................................... 112 
E. Tebeau’s Due Process Argument ............................................. 112 
F. Tebeau’s First Amendment Argument ..................................... 115 
V. ARGUMENT ................................................................................ 117 
A. The Supreme Court Should Have Granted Tebeau’s Petition 
for Certiorari. .......................................................................... 117 
B. The Potential Implications of the Tebeau Decision Are 
Worrisome. ............................................................................... 119 
C. The Crack House Statute Threatens the Profitability of the 
Live Music Industry. ................................................................ 121 
D. The Music Industry Should Lobby on Tebeau’s Behalf. .......... 123 
E. Popular Culture’s Acceptance of Drug Use Is Problematic.... 125 
F. There is an Inherent Problem With the Current Wording of 
the Statute. ............................................................................... 126 
G. The Best Solution Is to Amend the Statute, Again. ................... 127 
VI. CONCLUSION ............................................................................. 129 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
Calvin Harris made an astounding $46 million in 2012, and the 
estimated $300,000 he made for one night’s performance in August of 
2013 was well worth the expense to his Las Vegas-based promoter.1 
Today, numbers like these are increasingly common as the music 
                                                                                                             
1 Ryan Mac and Zack O’Malley Greenburg, Sin City’s Latest Savior, FORBES, Sept. 2, 
2013, at 44. 
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industry continues to derive profits from festivals and concerts.2 Music 
festivals like Ultra,3 Bonnaroo,4 Coachella,5 and Austin City Limits6 
have become household names, as music fans young and old flock to 
cities all over the country each year to see their favorite musicians 
perform. 
While those in the industry are excited by the rising prevalence of 
this source of revenue, the dangers associated with large crowds of 
people congregating in one, high-energy atmosphere are palpable.7 Drug 
use at music festivals and concerts is rampant.8 “Club drug” use, 
combined with high temperatures and the inevitable dehydration 
resulting from such situations, led to at least seven deaths between March 
and September of 2013.9 Should concert promoters and venue managers 
be held responsible for the drug use at their events? If so, how can they 
be expected to prevent these drugs, some of which are no smaller than 
your average Tylenol pill, from entering a venue? The pervasiveness of 
these drugs at music festivals today, and the lack of any comprehensive 
legal guidance as to how concert promoters and venue managers should 
handle the situation, has created a grey area where their liability for such 
activities is unclear. 
Concert promoters and venue managers are especially vulnerable to 
prosecution under the “crack house statute,” 21 U.S.C. § 856, due to the 
statute’s over-inclusiveness and unclear language. The statute’s 
shortcomings are vividly illustrated in United States v. Tebeau, where the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found an organizer of an outdoor music 
festival criminally liable under Section 856(a)(2).10 Tebeau, the 
defendant, filed a petition for certiorari (the “Petition”) in July 2013, 
arguing that the Eighth Circuit’s finding that he “knowingly and 
intentionally” made his premises available for drug use was an invalid 
                                                                                                             
2 See Chris Parker, The Economics of Music Festivals: Who’s Getting Rich, Who’s 
Going Broke?, LA WEEKLY (Apr. 17, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://blogs.laweekly.com
/westcoastsound/2013/04/economics_of_music_festivals.php. 
3 ULTRA MUSIC FESTIVAL, http://www.ultramusicfestival.com (last visited Sept. 19, 
2014). 
4 BONNAROO MUSIC AND ARTS FESTIVAL, http://www.bonnaroo.com (last visited Sept. 
20, 2014). 
5 COACHELLA VALLEY MUSIC AND ARTS FESTIVAL, http://www.coachella.com/ (last 
visited Sept. 20, 2014). 
6 AUSTIN CITY LIMITS MUSIC FESTIVAL, http://www.aclfestival.com (last visited Sept. 
20, 2014). 
7 See Ben Sisario & James C. McKinley, Jr., Drug Deaths Threaten Rising Business 
of Electronic Music Fests, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2013, at A1. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 See, e.g., United States v. Tebeau, 713 F.3d 955 (8th Cir. 2013). 
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and overly zealous conclusion.11 The Supreme Court’s hasty denial12 of 
the Petition will likely have enormous implications for the music 
industry, creating a dangerous zone of liability for many concert 
promoters and venue managers who will be left with little guidance on 
how to prevent a situation analogous to Tebeau’s. Moreover, corporate 
sponsors and promoters may be less inclined to participate in certain 
types of music festivals, especially those that are associated with heavy 
drug use, for fear of the inevitable liability that will eventually become 
associated with those festivals. 
This Note will analyze the strengths and weaknesses of Tebeau’s 
arguments and supplement his points with the business and drug-culture 
realities of the music industry today. Section II will specifically illustrate 
the current state of the live music industry, addressing both its positive 
and negative aspects. Section III will present the crack house statute, the 
purposes for its enactment, and the 2003 amendment to the statute that is 
at issue in the Petition. Section IV will explain the facts of the Tebeau 
case, the arguments put forth, and the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning. Section 
V will argue that, as it stands, the statute is a hindrance to the music 
industry. Section V will subsequently propose another amendment to the 
crack house statute, one that would address the concerns outlined in this 
Note, suggesting additional requirements that venue managers and 
concert promoters take “reasonable precautions” to prevent illicit 
activities at their events and to ensure that medical attention for patrons 
is readily available. Section V will then clarify the reasoning behind the 
proposed amendment, the main goals of which are to allow a positive 
trend in the music industry to thrive and to protect the health and safety 
of live music fans. 
II. SETTING THE STAGE 
A. The Trend Toward More Music Festivals Is Significant. 
The global recorded music industry in 2012 saw its first rise in 
revenue since 1999 largely due to the increase in digital music sales.13 
Global digital revenues climbed nine percent, according to the 
                                                                                                             
11 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Tebeau v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 314 (No. 13-
146) (2013). 
12 See Tebeau v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 314 (2013). 
13 Richard Smirke, IFPI Digital Music Report 2013: Global Recorded Music Revenues 
Climb for First Time Since 1999, BILLBOARD (Feb. 26, 2013, 8:52 AM), 
http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/digital-and-mobile/1549915/ifpi-digital-
music-report-2013-global-recorded-music. 
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International Federation of the Phonographic Industry’s14 2013 Digital 
Music Report,15 helping to raise global digital music revenues to $5.6 
billion, up from $5.1 billion in 2011.16 While the media tends to focus on 
digital music’s role in saving the recorded music industry,17 the lack of 
attention to live music’s contribution to the industry as a whole is 
remarkable. 
In 2010, corporate concert promoter Live Nation merged with ticket 
vendor Ticketmaster to create Live Nation Entertainment.18 Live Nation 
Entertainment, now a giant in the industry, had a record summer in 2013, 
bringing in $2.3 billion of revenue.19 According to Billboard,20 
worldwide concert ticket sales increased approximately thirty percent 
between 2012 and 2013.21 Because hundreds of thousands of people are 
often willing to spend between three and four hundred dollars on one 
festival pass, corporate sponsors are inevitably attracted to such events. 
Live Nation Entertainment’s Sponsorship & Advertising segment had a 
fifteen percent increase in revenue between the third quarter of 2012 and 
the third quarter of 2013.22 Although still a very new festival series, the 
Made In America Festival landed Budweiser as its corporate sponsor.23 
The 2014 Bonnaroo Music and Arts Festival had a list of major corporate 
sponsors that included, but was certainly not limited to, Miller Lite, Ford, 
Gap, and Ben & Jerry’s.24 Coachella’s sponsors in 2014 included 
                                                                                                             
14 The International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (the “IFPI”) represents 
“the interests of 1,300 record companies from across the globe.” See IFPI, 
http://www.ifpi.org/about.php (last visited Oct. 5, 2014). 
15 IFPI Digital Music Report 2013 http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/dmr2013.pdf at 
6. 
16 Id. 
17 See Eric Pfanner, Music Industry Sales Rise, and Digital Revenue Gets the Credit, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2013, at B3. 
18 TICKETMASTER, http://www.ticketmaster.com/about/about-us.html (last visited Sept. 
20, 2014). 
19 Live Nation, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 3 (November 5, 2013) [hereinafter Live 
Nation Third Quarter Report]. 
20 Known as “the world’s premier music publication,” Billboard’s “popular music 
charts have evolved into the primary source of information on trends and innovation in 
music, serving music fans, artists, top executives, tour promoters, publishers, radio 
programmers, lawyers, retailers, digital entrepreneurs and many others.” See BILLBOARD, 
http://www.billboard.com/articles/news/467859/about-us (last visited Oct. 5, 2014). 
21 Ray Waddell, Live and On Fire, BILLBOARD, Dec. 21, 2013, at 44. 
22 See Live Nation Third Quarter Report, supra note 19, at 34. 
23 BUDWEISER MADE IN AMERICA FESTIVAL, http://budweisermadeinamericafestival
.tumblr.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2014). 
24 BONNAROO PARTNERS, http://www.bonnaroo.com//get-involved/partners/ (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2014). 
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Heineken, H&M, Samsung, and Red Bull.25 The prevalence of live music 
as a source of revenue, corporate sponsorship, and consumer 
involvement is now undeniable. 
B. This Trend is Beneficial and Should Be Encouraged. 
Music festivals transform their host cities or towns into music-fan 
destinations, a transformation that not only helps the industry at large, 
but also pours millions of dollars into these cities’ revenue streams. In 
2012, the Washington Economics Group estimated that the Ultra Music 
Festival contributes approximately $79 million into the Miami-Dade 
County economy each year.26 The local economic benefits of music 
festivals are not limited to major tourist cities like Miami; indeed, dozens 
of other cities see their economies skyrocket in the weeks surrounding 
their major festivals. Every spring, some of the best jazz and rock 
musicians in the world travel to New Orleans, Louisiana, for The New 
Orleans Jazz & Heritage Festival.27 It is estimated that “Jazz Fest,”28 
which began in 1970, now attracts approximately 400,000 attendees and 
generates approximately $300 million each year.29 These economic 
benefits are conspicuous and not just to the residents of a city like New 
Orleans, which is known for its vibrant live music scene. 
Concerts and music festivals provide a stream of income to local 
food, alcohol, and merchandise vendors, hotels and restaurants, and taxi 
services. While the album cover and record store advertisements clearly 
do their parts, an artist’s best publicity arguably comes from a great live 
performance. In addition to increasing their fan bases at music festivals 
by being exposed to attendees who had never before seen particular 
artists, most concert and festival promoters allow artists to sell their own 
merchandise at events. 
While the economic benefits of concerts and festivals are plentiful, 
this sector of the industry has an unfortunate dark side. When thousands 
of young, dance-hungry patrons congregate in one confined space, health 
and safety problems are bound to surface. Dangerous drug use at these 
                                                                                                             
25 COACHELLA SPONSORS, http://www.coachella.com/festival-info/sponsors (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2014). 
26 Hannah Sampson, Ultra Music Festival Pours Millions into Economy, Study Says, 
MIAMI HERALD (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/10/10/3042176/ultra-
music-festival-pours-millions.html. 
27 NEW ORLEANS JAZZ & HERITAGE FESTIVAL, http://www.nojazzfest.com (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2014). 
28 The New Orleans Jazz & Heritage Festival is more commonly known as “Jazz Fest.” 
29 Adriana Lopez, New Orleans Jazz Fest Comes Full Circle with Its Mission, FORBES 
(May 6, 2013, 4:33 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/adrianalopez/2013/05/06/new-
orleans-jazz-fest-comes-full-circle-with-its-mission/. 
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events has become a stark reality in recent years; as the public becomes 
aware of this reality, a looming threat to the live-music industry will 
continue to grow. 
C. The Pervasiveness of Drug Use at Music Festivals Is 
Substantial. 
It was 107 degrees on Governor’s Island when twenty-year-old 
Matthew Rybarczyk collapsed at the 2013 Electric Zoo Festival in New 
York.30 Fourteen hours after his grandmother visited him in the hospital, 
the young man was dead.31 A significant amount of the party drug, 
“Molly,” was found in his system.32 
Deaths from drug use at music festivals are not uncommon; between 
March and September of 2013, at least seven people attending electronic 
dance music (“EDM”) festivals died after exhibiting symptoms 
consistent with “party drug” overdoses.33 When the death toll reached 
two at the 2013 Electric Zoo Festival, the entire event was cut short, as 
the dangers quickly began to outweigh any benefit of following through 
with the planned set list.34 These tragic losses of life may have drastic 
effects on the music industry as “[e]xecutives say that deaths like these 
have the potential to scare off investors and the corporate sponsors that 
are eager to reach the genre’s young, affluent and technologically 
connected fans.”35 
Ecstasy, or MDMA, became prevalent in the late 1990s and early 
2000s.36 “Molly,” which is slang for a pure, powder or crystal form of 
MDMA,37 has become popular at music festivals in recent years.38 While 
the media initially associated MDMA with a “deviant youth 
subculture,”39 often tied to the “rave scene,”40 modern EDM has 
arguably adopted many of the rave scene’s problematic aspects, as 
                                                                                                             




34 See Jon Pareles, Dancing in the Eternal Present, Before Harsh Reality Intervened, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 2, 2013, at C1. 
35 Sisario & McKinley, Jr., supra note 7, at A1. 
36 Deborah Ahrens, Drug Panics in the Twenty-First Century: Ecstasy, Prescription 
Drugs, and the Reframing of the War on Drugs, 6 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 397, 404 (2013). 
37 See DrugFacts: MDMA (Ecstasy or Molly), NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, 
http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/mdma-ecstasy-or-molly (last visited 
Sep. 26, 2014). 
38 See Sisario & McKinley, Jr., supra note 7, at A1. 
39 Ahrens, supra note 36, at 412. 
40 Shadi Kardan, Comment, The Government’s New War on Drugs: Threatening the 
Right to Dance!, 29 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 99, 100-03 (2003). 
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evidenced by the aforementioned MDMA-related deaths. Although raves 
were distinctive in the late 1990s and early 2000s, largely because of the 
electronic music and “underground” nature of such events,41 today such 
music has migrated from the fringes of society to the mainstream music 
culture. 
There is a subtle, yet clearly problematic, endorsement of the rave 
culture in modern-day EDM. Madonna, known more for her pop music 
than her recent endeavor into EDM, titled her twelfth studio album 
“MDNA.”42 The pop star’s not-so-subtle play on words demonstrates 
how the mainstream music culture has come to embrace, albeit not 
directly, the club drug culture. Madonna, as a major pop star and 
representative of the mainstream music culture, has perpetuated the 
normalization of club drug use through her actions. During her 2012 
performance at Ultra, Madonna allegedly screamed to the crowd, “How 
many people in this crowd have seen ‘Molly’?”43 
The EDM fan base is growing: as of September 2013, the EDM 
industry was estimated to be worth $4.5 billion.44 It is no secret that the 
artists and promoters in the business are aware of the rampant drug use at 
their festivals, so for the sake of continued growth of the live music 
industry, these problems must be addressed. And as long as this culture 
remains the status quo, there is at least one federal law45 that poses a 
significant danger to the music industry.46 
III. THE CRACK HOUSE STATUTE 
A. The Substance and Purpose of the Original Crack House 
Statute 
Section (a)(1) of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, also known as 
the “crack house statute,” made it illegal to “knowingly open or maintain 
any place, for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or using any 
controlled substance.”47 Section (a)(2) of the statute made it illegal to 
                                                                                                             
41 Id. at 101. 
42 MADONNA, MDNA (Interscope Records 2012). 
43 Pareles, supra note 34, at C1. Madonna is not the only major pop star to make such a 
reference. “Today, stars like Miley Cyrus and Kanye West allude to molly in songs, and 
the term turns up repeatedly at festivals, on T-shirts, banners or body paint.” Sisario & 
McKinley, Jr., supra note 7, at A1. 
44 Sisario & McKinley, Jr., supra note 7, at A1. 
45 See infra Part III. 
46 See infra Part IV-V. 
47 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) (1986). 
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manage or control any building, room, or enclosure, 
either as an owner, lessee, agent, employee, or 
mortgagee, and knowingly and intentionally rent, lease, 
or make available for use, with or without compensation, 
the building, room, or enclosure for the purpose of 
unlawfully manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using 
a controlled substance.48 
The original crack house statute was designed to punish those who 
used their property to run drug businesses.49 Congress explained that one 
of the 1986 Act’s functions was to “outla[w] [the] operation of houses or 
buildings, so-called ‘crack houses,’ where ‘crack,’ cocaine and other 
drugs are manufactured and used.”50 The 1986 Act, as the name suggests, 
addressed a very specific problem during the height of the 1980’s crack 
epidemic.51 The statute’s nickname, the “crack house statute,” was 
wholly appropriate as the original wording of the statute made it very 
clear whom the statute was targeting.52 
B. The 2003 Amendment to the Crack House Statute 
In 2003, the statute was amended to its present language.53 Although 
the “knowingly” and “for the purpose” clauses from the original 1986 
version remain in Section (a)(1), the 2003 amendment broadened the 
statute to also include those who “lease, rent, or use . . . any place, 
whether permanently or temporarily.”54 Section (a)(2) of the statute now 
makes it illegal to 
manage or control any place, whether permanently or 
temporarily, either as an owner, lessee, agent, employee, 
occupant, or mortgagee, and knowingly and intentionally 
rent, lease, profit from, or make available for use, with 
or without compensation, the place for the purpose of 
                                                                                                             
48 § 856(a)(2). 
49 See U.S. v. Verners, 53 F.3d 291, 296 (10th Cir. 1995). 
50 132 CONG. REC. 26,474 (1986). 
51 See 132 CONG. REC. 14,097-99 (1986) (statement of Sen. Chiles); H.R.J. Res. 678, 
99th Cong. (1986). 
52 § 856(a)(2). The original crack house statute targeted specifically those who 
controlled any building, room, or enclosure who made that property available for the use, 
distribution, manufacture or storage of illegal drugs. 
53 See Illicit Drug Anti-Proliferation Act of 2003, S. 226, 108th Cong. (2003). 
54 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) (2012). 
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unlawfully manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using 
a controlled substance.55 
A person convicted under this statute may be sentenced to a prison 
term of up to twenty years or “a fine of not more than $500,000, or both, 
or a fine of $2,000,000 for a person other than an individual.”56 
Moreover, one who violates this statute may be liable for civil 
penalties.57 
The 2003 amendment expanded the range of people who may be 
affected by the statute, thereby increasing the possibility that Section 
856(a)(1) could be deemed unconstitutionally vague if construed 
expansively.58 The specificity of the 1986 crack house statute was 
diminished, as the 2003 amendment enabled the crack house statute to be 
applied to “single-event” activities, not just to ongoing drug distribution 
operations.59 The amendment clarified that a “one-time event . . . where 
the promoter knowingly distributes [drugs] over the course of an 
evening . . . violates the statute the same as a crack house which is in 
operation over a period of time.”60 Moreover, the amendment made the 
statute apply to outdoor as well as indoor venues in order to reach rogue 
promoters that used fields to distribute controlled substances.61 
Drafted at a time when ecstasy usage was considered a grave 
problem, the 2003 amendment was originally referred to as the RAVE 
Act, which stood for “Reducing Americans’ Vulnerability to Ecstasy 
Act.”62 The RAVE Act, however, was highly criticized due to the 
findings section of the bill, which accused property owners and rave 
promoters of being intentional profiteers of illicit drug use.63 As a result, 
the RAVE Act died at the end of 2002, until former Senator, and current 
Vice President, Joe Biden reintroduced a slightly modified version in 
February of 2003, which took out the controversial findings section.64 
                                                                                                             
55 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) (2012) (emphasis added). 
56 21 U.S.C. § 856(b) (2012). 
57 21 U.S.C. § 856(d) (2012). 
58 See Shetler, F.3d at 1164. 
59 149 CONG. REC. 1847 (2003) (statement of Sen. Biden). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 See Reducing Americans’ Vulnerability to Ecstasy (RAVE) Act, H.R. 718, 108th 
Cong. (2003). 
63 See 148 CONG. REC. 10,671 (2002). 
64 See Illicit Drug Anti-Proliferation Act of 2003, S. 226, 108th Cong. (2003); 149 
CONG. REC. 1846, 1847 (2003) (statement of Sen. Biden). 
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The bill was re-named the “Illicit Drug Anti-Proliferation Act,” and it 
was attached as a rider to the Amber Alert Bill, which Congress passed.65 
C. The Purpose of the 2003 Amendment to the Crack House 
Statute 
Senator Grassley, a co-sponsor of the 2003 bill, explained why the 
crack house statute needed to be updated: “[I]t is important that we 
update the laws that have been effectively used to shut down crack 
houses so they can go after temporary events used as a cover to sell 
drugs.”66 He further explained, “as drug dealers discover new drugs and 
new methods of pushing their poison, we must make sure our legal 
system is adequately structured to react appropriately. I believe this 
legislation does that.”67 Senator Biden emphasized that the 2003 version 
of the statute was specifically intended to prohibit ecstasy use and to 
simultaneously target the problematic “Rave Scene” at the time: 
This legislation arises out of a hearing Senator Grassley 
and I held in the Senate Caucus on International 
Narcotics Control in December 2001 on the proliferation 
of Ecstasy and other club drugs generally, and the role of 
some promoters of all-night dance parties, known as 
‘‘raves’’, in distributing Ecstasy to young people. Our 
bill provides Federal prosecutors the tools needed to 
combat the manufacture, distribution or use of any 
controlled substance at any venue whose purpose is to 
engage in illegal narcotics activity.68 
Senator Grassley noted the dangers of ecstasy and detailed how 
certain promoters take advantage of the drug’s use at their shows: 
Ecstasy raises the heart rate to dangerous levels, and in 
some cases the heart will stop. It also causes severe 
dehydration, a condition that is exacerbated by the high 
levels of physical exertion that happens at raves. Users 
must constantly drink water in an attempt to cool off—a 
fact that some unscrupulous event promoters take 
advantage of by charging exorbitant fees for bottles of 
                                                                                                             
65 See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children 
Today (PROTECT) Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003); 149 CONG. REC. 1847 
(2003) (statement of Sen. Biden). 
66 149 CONG. REC. 1849 (statement of Sen. Grassley). 
67 Id. at 1848. 
68 149 CONG. REC. 1846 (2003) (statement of Sen. Biden). 
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water, after cutting off water to drinking fountains and 
rest room sinks. Too often, Ecstasy users collapse and 
die because their bodies overheat.69 
Senator Biden addressed, even at this introductory juncture, his 
critics’ concerns with the bill, yet he explicitly denied that the 
amendment would be used to target concert promoters: 
We know that there will always be certain people who 
will bring drugs into musical or other events and use 
them without the knowledge or permission of the 
promoter or club owner. This is not the type of activity 
that my bill would address. The purpose of my 
legislation is not to prosecute legitimate law-abiding 
managers of stadiums, arenas, performing arts centers, 
licensed beverage facilities and other venues because 
of incidental drug use at their events. In fact, when 
crafting this legislation, I took steps to ensure that it did 
not capture such cases. My bill would help in the 
prosecution of rogue promoters who not only know that 
there is drug use at their event but also hold the event 
for the purpose of illegal drug use or distribution.70 
Senator Biden continuously stressed that the statute would not target 
responsible promoters,71 noting, “neither current law nor my bill seeks to 
punish a promoter for the behavior of their patrons.”72 He even described 
the type of promoters he was targeting: 
[T]here are a few promoters out there who are taking 
steps to profit from drug activity at their events. Some of 
these folks actually distribute drugs themselves or have 
their staff distribute drugs, get kickbacks from drug sales 
at their events, have thinly veiled drug messages on their 
promotional flyers, tell their security to ignore drug use 
or sales, or send patients who need medical attention 
because of a drug overdose to a hospital across town so 
that people won’t link emergency room visits with their 
club.73 
                                                                                                             
69 Id. at 1848 (statement of Sen. Grassley). 
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Biden explained that he did not intend to provide “a disincentive for 
promoters to take steps to protect the public health of their patrons 
including providing water or air conditioned rooms, making sure that 
there is an ambulance on the premises, etc.”74 He explicitly noted, “there 
are legitimate reasons for selling water, having a room where people can 
cool down after dancing, or having an ambulance on hand. Clearly, the 
presence of any of these things is not enough to signify that an event is 
‘for the purpose of’ drug use.”75 His statements indicate that the statute 
was not designed to discourage promoters from taking safety precautions 
nor was it designed to prevent these types of concerts from taking place. 
Biden clarified, “If rave promoters and sponsors operate such events as 
they are so often advertised as places for people to come dance in a safe, 
drug-free environment then they have nothing to fear from this law. In no 
way is this bill aimed at stifling any type of music or expression[;] it is 
only trying to deter illicit drug use and protect kids.”76 The legislative 
record and the wording of the statute itself suggest that its goal was to 
curb drug use on a larger scale, however, the statute’s ambiguous nature 
has allowed it to be used for other purposes. 
IV. UNITED STATES V. TEBEAU 
A. Introduction 
What happens when the crack house statute is used to go after a 
concert promoter?77 When the court allows the intent requirement of the 
statute to be satisfied by third parties, it potentially creates a zone of 
liability where any concert promoter can be convicted under the statute 
due to the rampant drug use that occurs at many music festivals and 
concerts. In United States v. Tebeau, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the validity of the crack house statute and effectively deemed an 
organizer of an outdoor music festival as criminally liable under the 
crack house statute.78 Tebeau’s conviction and the Supreme Court’s 
denial of his Petition should raise awareness as to the problematic 
aspects of the statute’s current form. 
                                                                                                             
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 1847-48. 
76 Id. at 1848. 
77 See United States v. Tebeau, 713 F.3d 955 (8th Cir. 2013). 
78 Id. 
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B. Facts and Procedural History of United States v. Tebeau 
James Tebeau owned approximately three hundred acres of land in 
Shannon County, Missouri, which he frequently utilized to promote a 
series of weekend music festivals.79 Festival attendees would pay sixty 
dollars to enter Tebeau’s property for three-day festivals, and the number 
in attendance at each festival ranged from 3,600 to nearly 8,000.80 After 
several drug-related arrests near the property, undercover law 
enforcement officers conducted an operation at his festivals, making over 
150 controlled purchases of illegal drugs.81 “The officers observed 100 to 
200 drug dealers at each festival and estimated that approximately 
$500,000 worth of illegal drugs was sold at each event.”82 The officers 
witnessed open drug use and open drug sales among festival attendees, as 
many dealers refrained from using any sort of discretion.83 
Tebeau was present at each of these festivals.84 Aware that the drug 
use and drug sales were going on, Tebeau took the precaution to set up a 
medical facility on the premises known as “Safestock,” where attendees 
who had overdosed on dangerous drugs could be treated.85 He instructed 
his employees that certain types of drugs, including marijuana, LSD, and 
mushrooms, were permissible at the events.86 “According to employees, 
Tebeau instructed security guards in the camp to move sellers away from 
the front gates to avoid detection by law enforcement officers.”87 After 
officers executed a search warrant in November 2010, Tebeau was later 
indicted for managing drug-involved premises in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§ 856 (a)(2).88 
Tebeau moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that the government 
did not allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that “he had the specific 
intent to sell drugs on his property.”89 After the district court denied the 
motion, Tebeau entered a conditional guilty plea reserving his right to 
appeal the motion.90 In the plea agreement, the government stipulated 
that Tebeau had not personally participated in any drug sales, but Tebeau 
admitted that he had “intended [his property to] be made available” for 
                                                                                                             
79 Id. at 957. 
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people “who had the intent to sell and use controlled substances.”91 
Although undercover officers alleged that they made some drug 
purchases in the presence of festival security, Tebeau did not stipulate to 
that fact in his plea.92 However, he did agree that 700 kilograms of 
marijuana had likely been distributed on his premises.93 
The district court sentenced Tebeau to thirty months imprisonment, 
two years of supervised release, and a $50,000 fine, and he was required 
to forfeit his property to the government.94 Tebeau appealed the district 
court’s denial of his motion to dismiss to the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s finding.95 Most notably, the 
Eighth Circuit concluded that Tebeau did not need to have the illegal 
purpose proscribed by the statute96; rather, the various people who 
attended the festivals on his property could fulfill the statute’s required 
illegal purpose.97 Tebeau filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme 
Court of the United States on July 29, 2013, challenging the Eighth 
Circuit’s decision.98 However, the Supreme Court denied the Petition on 
October 7, 2013.99 
C. Tebeau’s Textual Argument 
Tebeau argued that the district court’s reading of Section 856(a)(2) 
conflicted with the statute’s textual and legislative history and that the 
statute should be interpreted to require proof that he specifically intended 
illegal drugs to be manufactured, stored, distributed, or used on his 
property.100 The district court found that no such proof was required; 
instead, the court found that the statute only required the government to 
show that Tebeau intended to make his property available for others who 
had that purpose.101 
The Eighth Circuit, without any binding precedent in the context of 
music festivals, relied on other circuit courts of appeal to determine how 
                                                                                                             
91 Id. 
92 Transcript of Change of Plea Hearing at 18-20, United States v. Tebeau, No. 1:11-
cr-00083-SNLJ (E.D. Mo. 2012) (No. 113). 
93 Id. at 19. 
94 Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 18-25, United States v. Tebeau, No. 1:11-cr-
00083-SNLJ (E.D. Mo. 2012) (No. 101). 
95 Tebeau, 713 F.3d at 963. 
96 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) prohibits one to “manage or control any place . . . and 
knowingly and intentionally . . . make available for use . . . the place for the purpose of 
unlawfully manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using a controlled substance.” 
97 Tebeau, 713 F.3d at 961. 
98 See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11. 
99 Tebeau v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 314 (2013). 
100 Tebeau, 713 F.3d at 958-59. 
101 Id. at 959. 
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to interpret the statute.102 More specifically, the Eighth Circuit examined 
the decision in United States v. Chen, where the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals concluded that the government did not need to show that a 
property owner had the purpose of storing, distributing, using, or 
manufacturing a controlled substance in order to convict her under 
Section 856(a)(2).103 In Chen, the Fifth Circuit concluded, “the phrase 
for the purpose of applies to the person who opens or maintains the place 
for the illegal activity.”104 However, the Fifth Circuit also concluded that 
under Section 856(a)(2), “the person who manages or controls the 
[property] . . . need not have the express purpose . . . that drug related 
activity is taking place,” as long as others on the property have that 
purpose.105 The Fifth Circuit reasoned, “[i]t is well established that a 
statute should be construed so that each of its provisions is given its full 
effect; interpretations which render parts of a statute inoperative or 
superfluous are to be avoided.”106 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit found 
that Section 856 (a)(2) would be redundant if it required the same actor-
specific intent already necessitated by Section 856 (a)(1).107 
Moreover, the Eighth Circuit analyzed United States v. Tamez, where 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the “‘plain meaning 
and interrelation of the two [Section] 856 provisions suggest that Section 
856(a)(2) does not require proof that the defendant intended to use a 
property for a prohibited purpose.”108 The Eighth Circuit also referenced 
United States v. Wilson, where the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
found that any other reading of Section 856(a)(1) and Section 856 (a)(2) 
would “conflate [the] two subsections, rendering one superfluous.”109 
Based on the reasoning of the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuit Courts, 
the Eighth Circuit found that Section 856 (a)(2) did not require proof that 
Tebeau had the illegal purpose to use, manufacture, sell, or distribute 
controlled substances.110 Rather, it was sufficient that Tebeau intended to 
make his property available to others who had that purpose.111 
In the Petition, Tebeau argued that, because Section 856 (a)(2) adds 
“storing” to the list of prohibitions in the statute, that particular provision 
                                                                                                             
102 Id. 
103 Id. (citing United States v. Chen, 913 F.2d 183, 190 (5th Cir. 1990)). 
104 See Chen, 913 F.2d at 190. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id.; see 21 U.S.C. §§ 856(a)(1)-(2) (2012). 
108 Tebeau, 713 F.3d at 960 (quoting United States v. Tamez, 941 F.2d 770, 774 (9th 
Cir. 1991)). 
109 Id. (quoting United States v. Wilson, 503 F.3d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 2007)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
110 Id. at 961. 
111 Id. 
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is not wholly superfluous with Section (a)(1) if read on its own.112 His 
argument contrasted with the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning, which 
maintained that, because Section 856(a)(1) contained an intent 
requirement for the actor, an identical requirement in Section 856(a)(2) 
would be “superfluous” or unnecessary.113 According to Tebeau, if the 
actor had as part of his illegal purpose renting the place to another for the 
purpose of storing a controlled substance, that person could be 
prosecuted only under Section 856 (a)(2) but not under Section 856 
(a)(1).114 Tebeau argued that the Eighth Circuit violated a well-
established statutory rule: that “identical words used in different parts of 
the same act are intended to have the same meaning.”115 If the prohibited 
purpose in Section 856 (a)(1) unambiguously applied to the actor in the 
statute, then Section 856 (a)(2) had to be interpreted in the same manner 
because it shared the same grammatical structure with Section 856 
(a)(1).116 “Although there is some overlap between the two provisions, 
each section captured [prohibited] conduct that the other did not.”117 
Finally, Tebeau argued that his interpretation of the statute was 
consistent with congressional intent118 and was mandated by the rule of 
lenity.119 Tebeau pointed to former senator, and co-sponsor of the 2003 
Amendment to the statute, Joe Biden’s comments,120 which purportedly 
underscored his point that the actor in the statute must possess the illegal 
purpose prohibited by Section 856 (a)(2) to be convicted under the 
statute.121 
                                                                                                             
112 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 20. 
113 Tebeau, 713 F.3d at 960; see also Wilson, 503 F.3d at 198; Chen, 913 F.2d at 190. 
114 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 8. 
115 Id. at 20 (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995)). 
116 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 21. Tebeau argued that the Eighth 
Circuit essentially read Section 856 (a)(2) as follows: “it shall be unlawful to manage or 
control . . . and knowingly and intentionally rent, lease, profit from, or make available for 
use . . . the place [to others who have] the purpose . . . ” Id. 
117 Id. at 8; see 21 U.S.C. § 856 (2012). The “storing” prohibition is found in section 
(a)(2), but not in section (a)(1). 
118 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 23. 
119 See id. at 24. “The purposes underlying the rule of lenity [are] to promote fair notice 
to those subject to the criminal laws, to minimize the risk of selective or arbitrary 
enforcement, and to maintain the proper balance between Congress, prosecutors, and 
courts.” See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988). 
120 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 23; see 149 Cong. Rec. 1847 (2003) 
(statement of Sen. Biden); see also infra Part III-C. 
121 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 24. 
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D. Tebeau’s Procedural Argument 
Tebeau also argued that his indictment was deficient pursuant to 
Rule 7(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure122 because there 
was no allegation that Tebeau was personally involved in any illicit drug 
transaction.123 Therefore, he could not possess the illegal purpose 
proscribed by the statute.124 The government conceded that there were no 
such allegations but argued that this was irrelevant because the 
indictment tracked the language of the statute, and the main purpose of 
many of the campers who attended the festival was to sell and use 
drugs.125 The Eighth Circuit rejected Tebeau’s procedural argument, 
concluding “[t]he indictment sufficiently described Tebeau’s offense 
conduct in making his property available for illegal use.”126 
E. Tebeau’s Due Process Argument 
Tebeau further argued that the court’s interpretation of the statute as 
lacking a specific intent requirement rendered the statute 
unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Fifth Amendment.127 
Specifically, Tebeau contended that by allowing the statute’s intent 
requirement to be satisfied by third parties, the defendant does not 
receive the necessary “notice” required by due process.128 Such an 
interpretation would enable the government to enforce the statute 
selectively, thus giving festival promoters no guidance as to what level of 
precautions they could lawfully make available to treat attendees who 
use drugs at music festivals.129 
The Eighth Circuit, however, found that the statute provided 
sufficient notice.130 The court utilized the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ 
decision in United States v. Rosa, which found that Section 856(a)(2) 
“furnishes fair notice that it is illegal for a homeowner to knowingly and 
intentionally allow her house to be used in the distribution of drugs.”131 
                                                                                                             
122 Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1). “The indictment or information must be a plain, concise, 
and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense 
charged . . . .A count may allege that the means by which the defendant committed the 
offense are unknown or that the defendant committed it by one or more specified means.” 
Id. 
123 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 6. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Tebeau, 713 F.3d at 963. 
127 Id. at 961; see U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
128 Tebeau, 713 F.3d at 961. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. (quoting United States v. Rosa, 50 F. App’x 226, 227 (6th Cir. 2008)). 
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Based on the Rosa reasoning, the Eighth Circuit found that “the inclusion 
of a specific mens rea element132 provided[ed] fair notice to Tebeau and 
others that certain conduct [addressed in the statute] is prohibited.”133 
The court found no evidence to support the proposition that Section 856 
(a)(2) itself led to any arbitrary enforcement.134 The Eighth Circuit 
concluded that the open and obvious drug-use taking place on Tebeau’s 
property was “precisely the conduct prohibited by [Section] 856(a)(2)’s 
plain language, and the statute therefore was not unconstitutionally vague 
as applied to Tebeau.”135 
The court failed to address what precautions a property owner could 
take to avoid liability under the crack house statute.136 Tebeau asserted 
that the court mistakenly dismissed his arbitrary enforcement claim, 
when it summarily concluded that he had provided no evidentiary 
support for his argument.137 Notably, the court failed to address his claim 
that the prosecution did not comport with existing DEA guidelines138 and 
that it did not address the many instances of music festivals in Missouri 
and surrounding states with similar drug-related problems but no 
prosecutions.139 
Tebeau relied on Supreme Court reasoning that “[a] statute which 
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men 
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ 
as to its application, violates this first essential of due process of law.”140 
He distinguished Rosa on the basis that the defendant in that case 
allowed people to use and sell drugs in her house.141 Such a distinction 
was critical because controlling activities that occur in one’s house is 
substantially different than controlling activities of thousands of people 
spread over a 350-acre property.142 
                                                                                                             
132 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1134 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “mens rea” as “[t]he state 
of mind that the prosecution, to secure a conviction, must prove that a defendant had 
when committing a crime.”). 
133 Tebeau, 713 F.3d at 961. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 961-62. 
136 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 14. 
137 See id. 
138 “Tebeau noted that his prosecution did not appear to follow the guidelines published 
by the Drug Enforcement Administration . . . on its own website.” Id. at 9-10. 
139 Id. at 14. “Tebeau noted that no other concert promoter and/or outdoor music 
festival organizer had been prosecuted in this district or surrounding district . . . .Tebeau 
introduced evidence of a number of music festivals in Missouri and surrounding states 
where significant illicit drug activity was taking place, including drug-related injuries and 
deaths.” Id. at 10. 
140 Id. at 25 (citing Connolly v. Gen. Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)). 
141 Id. at 26; Rosa, 50 F. App’x at 227-28. 
142 Id. 
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Tebeau supplemented his vagueness argument by contending that the 
precautions he took to ensure the safety of festival attendees were used 
against him to establish his liability, just as they were used against the 
owners of the State Palace Theatre in the case of McClure v. Ashcroft.143 
In McClure, an analogous situation existed where owners of a theatre 
were prosecuted in violation of Section 856 (a)(2) after an investigation 
showed that approximately seventy patrons had been transported from 
their theatre to the hospital for drug overdoses.144 Because of the 
statutory interpretation advanced in Chen, the government was able to 
prosecute the theatre’s owners even though they were not personally 
involved in the sale or distribution of drugs.145 
Despite precautions taken by the owners, it was not 
enough to avoid liability; rather, such precautions were 
used against the owners to establish liability. For 
example, the theater had medical personnel and an 
ambulance service on hand to assist or transport anyone 
in need. Yet, the Government argued that this very fact 
showed that the owners and promoters knew that patrons 
were likely to suffer the effects of drugs and alcohol.146 
By allowing the purpose element to be satisfied by the acts of others, 
a property owner is placed in a “Catch 22.”147 If venue managers and 
concert promoters do not provide safety precautions for the inevitable 
drug users at their events, they may be prosecuted or sued for their 
failure to do so; but, if they take those precautions, Tebeau argued, it 
could be used against them for Section 856 (a)(2) purposes.148 “Absent 
such a safe harbor, the only guaranteed way for a music promoter . . . to 
avoid liability under the [crack house] statute is to not hold the event at 
all.”149 
                                                                                                             
143 Id. at 28; see generally McClure v. Ashcroft 335 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2003). 
144 McClure, 335 F.3d at 406. The Fifth Circuit dismissed McClure, finding it non-
justiciable because “in a civil proceeding, at least under circumstances similar to those 
presented in this action, a third-party collateral attack on a final criminal judgment is 
nonjusticiable.” Id. at 414. 
145 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 28. 
146 Id. (citing McClure v. Ashcroft, No. CIV A 01-2573, 2002 WL 188410 (E.D. La. 
Feb. 1, 2002)). 
147 Id. at 29. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
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F. Tebeau’s First Amendment Argument 
Because the statute leaves a promoter or venue manager with little 
guidance how to avoid liability, Tebeau contended, the Eighth Circuit’s 
interpretation of Section 856(a)(2) violates his First Amendment rights 
by effectively preventing him, as well as other promoters, from 
organizing music festivals.150 The cumulative effect of the court’s 
statutory interpretation would be the “chilling” of free speech, 
particularly the freedom of expression associated with music festivals.151 
In analyzing his argument, the Eighth Circuit utilized the standard set 
forth in United States v. O’Brien: 
Where “‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are 
combined in the same course of conduct,” the 
government regulation is justified if (1) “it is within the 
constitutional power of the Government,” (2) “it furthers 
an important or substantial governmental interest,” (3) 
“the governmental interest is unrelated to the 
suppression of free expression,” and (4) “the incidental 
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no 
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that 
interest.”152 
In Tebeau’s case, only the third and fourth O’Brien elements are at 
issue.153 With respect to the third element, Tebeau argued that Section 
856(a)(2) fails “because it was originally aimed at eliminating music 
festivals with high drug use,” and music festivals are a form of protected 
speech.154 He further contended that “Section 856(a)(2) . . . fails to 
satisfy the fourth element because it too broadly punishes organizers and 
promoters of music festivals.”155 The Eighth Circuit, however, concluded 
the statute satisfied the O’Brien test and was therefore consistent with the 
First Amendment.156 The court reasoned that “the government interest in 
regulating drug use is unrelated to any incidental impact the law has on 
music festivals”157 and that “a prohibition on knowingly making 
premises available for drug use imposes only an incidental restriction on 
                                                                                                             
150 Tebeau, 713 F.3d at 962. 
151 Id.; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 10. 







116 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:95 
 
music festival hosts which does not ‘significantly compromise’ their 
First Amendment rights.”158 The Eighth Circuit also found that Tebeau’s 
concern about the statute’s “chilling effect” was overstated because he 
did not cite to any “case in which the government has charged another 
music festival organizer under the statute, and [because his] own 
involvement in the drug activities . . . was extensive.”159 
“Because a property owner is left guessing how to avoid liability,” 
owners might simply take the “prudent approach and not hold a musical 
event at all,” which would lead to the “chilling” effect of first 
amendment free speech.160 Tebeau argued that “the Eighth Circuit 
conducted a superficial analysis” of the two O’Brien prongs at issue161 
and that the Eighth Circuit failed to apply the court’s interpretation of the 
O’Brien test as modified in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-
Violence.162 Tebeau claimed that the government could not pass the 
standard set forth in Clark, namely, that “in analyzing content neutral 
regulations the balancing must also take into account whether such 
regulations leave open ample alternative channels for communication of 
the information.”163 
In United States v. Alvarez, the Supreme Court of the United States 
explained, “the threat of criminal prosecution for making a false 
statement can inhibit the speaker from making true statements, thereby 
‘chilling’ a kind of speech that lies at the First Amendment’s heart.”164 
Tebeau argued that by adhering to the plain language of the crack house 
statute and by applying the mens rea requirement of the illegal purpose 
to the actor in the statute, the appropriate “breathing room” would be 
given to important First Amendment rights—playing and listening to 
music.165 With an additional mens rea requirement in tow, promoters 
could continue holding festivals without the cloud of uncertainty 
concerning liability under the crack house statute.166 
                                                                                                             
158 Id. (citing Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 
(1987)). 
159 Id. 
160 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 10; see generally N.Y. Times v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 300-01 (1964) (The court noted its concern that an Alabama libel 
law would “chill” free speech. The court found the law unconstitutional). 
161 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 30. 
162 Id.; see Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298-99 (1984)). 
163 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 30; see Clark, 468 U.S. at 293. 
164 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 31-32 (quoting United States v. 
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012)). In Alvarez, the court held that the Stolen Valor Act was 
a content-based restriction on free speech in violation of the First Amendment. 
165 Id. at 32. 
166 Id. 
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V. ARGUMENT 
A. The Supreme Court Should Have Granted Tebeau’s 
Petition for Certiorari. 
Because some of Tebeau’s arguments have substantial merit and 
because of the potential implications of the decision on the music 
industry, there was significant reason for the Supreme Court to have 
granted his Petition and reviewed the Eighth Circuit’s decision. In the 
Petition, Tebeau argued: 
The Court should grant certiorari because the Eighth 
Circuit’s decision threatens important public speech 
rights and creates uncertainty amongst musical festival 
promoters over what, if any, precautions can be taken to 
avoid liability under the crack house statute. Moreover, 
the Eighth Circuit’s decision is inconsistent with this 
Court’s prior decisions regarding statutory construction 
and the proper analysis to be conducted for vagueness 
and First Amendment challenges.167 
There is a three-part inquiry that must be satisfied in order for the 
Supreme Court to grant certiorari: 
[T]here must be a reasonable probability that four 
[m]embers of the Court would consider the underlying 
issue sufficiently meritorious for the grant of certiorari 
or the notation of probable jurisdiction; there must be a 
significant possibility of reversal of the lower court’s 
decision; and there must be a likelihood that irreparable 
harm will result if that decision is not stayed.168 
Tebeau’s prosecution will likely set a dangerous precedent for other 
concert promoters.169 Under the Eighth Circuit’s opinion, a concert 
“promoter [could] be held liable under the statute if he makes his land 
available for others to use [illegal drugs], even though his primary 
purpose is to host a musical event.”170 Tebeau’s argument that, “the 
Court should address this issue now and not wait for such an issue to 
                                                                                                             
167 Id. at 15. 
168 See Beaver v. Netherland, 101 F.3d 977, 978-79 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Barefoot v. 
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 895-96 (1983)). 
169 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 17. 
170 Id. 
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percolate in the other circuits,”171 was quite tangible due to the realities 
of the live music industry today and the uncertainties created by the 
current version of the crack house statute. 
As discussed previously,172 drug use at music festivals is prevalent 
and the music industry is deriving more of its profits than ever from its 
live music sector. Concert promoters and venue managers are not naïve; 
they are aware that drug use and drug sales are transpiring, despite any 
efforts to thwart such activities. Tebeau’s conviction and the Eighth 
Circuit’s affirmance of the conviction appear to be focused on Tebeau’s 
awareness that drug sales were going on at his festivals. While curtailing 
the distribution of drugs appears to be at the heart of the crack house 
statute,173 what the Eighth Circuit and what Tebeau’s petition fail to 
address substantially is that the statute also makes it illegal to “make 
available . . . the place for the purpose of  . . . using a controlled 
substance.”174 
Although most concert promoters are not as lax as Tebeau regarding 
drug distribution at festivals, drug use is inevitably happening. The 
primary purpose of these legitimate promoters is to promote and to 
present live music, but, because the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning was not 
overruled and because authorities are able to attack promoters for 
“knowingly” making their property available for drug use, these 
promoters may be subject to prosecution under the crack house statute 
based on the same reasoning by which Tebeau was convicted. The legal 
difference between the two potential situations–where promoters are 
facilitating the distribution or the use of drugs at their venues–is simply 
that one focuses on the “distribution” provision of Section (a)(2), while 
the other focuses on the “using a controlled substance” provision of 
Section (a)(2). Without a controlling decision as to how this statute ought 
to be interpreted and enforced in all federal Circuit Courts of Appeal, 
Tebeau is justified in contending that concert promoters are left with 
little guidance on avoiding prosecution under the crack house statute. 
Although it is fairly clear that Tebeau made his property available for 
drug use and drug distribution, the Supreme Court should have granted 
certiorari in order to address these fundamental inconsistencies in the 
current version of the crack house statute, which may very well lead to 
its arbitrary enforcement. Under the Eighth Circuit’s decision, the crack 
house statute could potentially be used to prosecute any concert promoter 
or venue owner presiding over an event where drug use is occurring. 
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Such a result will likely affect the entire live music industry, which will 
in turn hurt the entertainment industry and the many local economies 
benefitting from the substantial revenue live music produces. 
B. The Potential Implications of the Tebeau Decision Are 
Worrisome. 
In an age of a growing live music economy and an even faster 
growing EDM market, copious “club drug” use is an inevitable problem. 
Due to the significant health risks associated with such drug use and the 
substantial number of drug-related deaths at EDM festivals,175 the 
government may have good reason to eventually pursue and prosecute 
concert promoters and venue owners under the authority of the crack 
house statute. The constituents of various congressional districts may 
reasonably call on their representatives to rectify this problem, especially 
as drug overdoses at festivals continue to be reported in the news. 
Concert promoters and venue managers may very well become 
unwarranted targets in the fight against dangerous “club drug” use. 
The Tebeau decision may yield a limitless number of concert 
promoter and venue manager arrests, even in situations where the facts 
are not as compelling as they were in Tebeau’s case. As long as a third-
party can satisfy the “intent” requirement, concert promoters will be 
susceptible to prosecution under Section 856(a)(2). This is unfortunate 
for many reasons. In Tebeau’s case, he actually took several, arguably 
positive, safety precautions. He explicitly prohibited what he deemed to 
be more “dangerous” drugs like crack-cocaine, methamphetamine, and 
nitrous oxide at his events.176 Cognizant of the on-going drug use, he set 
up medical aid facilities to treat patrons who had overdosed after 
ingesting illegal drugs.177 He instructed security to remove people who 
were out of control.178 He tried, in his own, however misguided, way to 
create a safe environment for his patrons to enjoy music, which he 
claimed to be the primary purpose of his festivals.179 
While the evidence shows that Tebeau intended to make his property 
available for drug use, an affirmance of his conviction, without further 
guidelines for concert promoters, may have dire consequences for the 
industry. The fact that it is not possible to completely eliminate drug use 
at music festivals was acknowledged by the applicable statute’s co-
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sponsors.180 For the same reason, it is nearly impossible to eliminate drug 
sales at music festivals. Because the statute prohibits making a property 
available for drug use and because the Tebeau case allows for a 
promoter’s conviction even where such an activity is not the primary 
purpose of an event, the promoters of certain musical genres should 
prepare for a series of future prosecutions as long as the Tebeau decision 
stands and the text of Section 856 remains unchanged. 
Further, given that the statute’s broader purpose is to curb drug use 
and drug sales181 and that the 2003 amendment expanded the statute to 
apply to outdoor festivals,182 it is reasonable to expect the government to 
pursue concert promoters and venue managers who may be associated 
with genres of music known for substantial drug use. Just as ecstasy use 
at raves was the public policy concern in 2003,183 the increasing number 
of deaths at EDM festivals today will likely catch the government’s 
attention and may turn into someone’s political agenda. 
The government may plausibly rely on the rampant drug use and 
deaths at EDM concerns as ammunition to prosecute promoters of other 
genres of music. Consider the promoters of Phish concerts.184 It is fairly 
common knowledge in the live music community that illegal drug use is 
common at Phish shows. As VICE writer Dick Corvette jested, “One 
does not simply walk into a Phish concert . . . not on drugs.”185 
Corvette’s VICE article highlights his experience attending his first 
Phish show and the market of illegal drugs available there: 
As with the Grateful Dead, there’s a weird little 
economy that operates within the context of Phish. 
People follow the band around, and then other people 
follow those people around selling stuff to the people 
following Phish around. It’s magical in its own way, and 
more than a little exploitative. One of these streets, and 
by far the most interesting one is called Shakedown 
Street, which if you’ve ever been to a Phish show (or 
Bonnaroo) before, is the “street” (read: row of cars) that 
you can buy drugs and other stuff on.186 
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Due to the common knowledge that drug use occurs among the fans 
of many varieties of musical genres, it is foreseeable under a Tebeau 
regime that the promoters of these concerts, who are certainly aware of 
the inherent drug use, will be prosecuted under the crack house statute. 
During the first three nights of Phish’s 2013 Madison Square Garden 
residency, at least 228 fans were arrested on drug charges.187 This Note is 
not advocating for the legalization of drugs188 but rather for a realistic 
assessment of the pervasiveness of drug use at many concerts and music 
festivals. Phish is merely a paradigmatic example of drug use being 
associated with a band’s fan base.189 This example emphasizes the facts 
that drug use and drug sales are occurring, concert promoters are aware 
of their occurrence, and such a reality breeds potential abuse of the crack 
house statute by authorities beyond the envisioned legislative purpose. 
While the potential for increased prosecution against promoters 
becomes a distinct possibility in the aftermath of the Tebeau decision, the 
precise goals of the statute’s co-sponsors190 remain overlooked. Senators 
Biden and Grassley emphasized that the statute was crafted to go after 
(1) promoters who seek to “profit” from drugs being used and sold at 
their events and (2) those individuals whose main purpose is to provide a 
venue for such activities.191 Rather than accomplish these goals, in 
upholding Tebeau’s conviction and rejecting his Petition, the Supreme 
Court implicitly authorizes the punishment of a promoter (1) who shared 
in none of the profits from the drug sales at his event and (2) whose main 
purpose was to merely facilitate a music festival. The affirmance of 
Tebeau’s conviction, therefore, has the effect of punishing the sort of 
promoter whom the statute was not designed to pursue. 
C. The Crack House Statute Threatens the Profitability of the 
Live Music Industry. 
The Tebeau case primarily addresses the criminal repercussions for a 
concert promoter for violating Section 856, but early critics of the 2003 
version of the statute recognized the dangers of the civil penalties for 
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which the statute provides.192 What will happen once a few more concert 
promoters are criminally prosecuted under the crack house statute and 
the families of drug overdose victims realize that those promoters are 
also liable for civil penalties? In addition to possible wrongful death suits 
and criminal prosecutions, promoters of all kinds could potentially face a 
series of lawsuits under the crack house statute. 
Rather than attracting additional corporate sponsors, the existing 
sponsors previously mentioned in this Note193 may shy away from such 
involvement once they realize that the promoters with whom they are 
doing business are civilly and criminally liable under the statute. Under 
Section 856 (d)(2), “[i]f a civil penalty is calculated . . . and there is more 
than [one] defendant, the court may apportion the penalty between 
multiple violators, but each violator shall be jointly and severally liable 
for the civil penalty under this subsection.”194 If sponsors are determined 
liable as co-defendants, their wallets, in addition to their reputations, will 
likely suffer. 
While there is no guarantee that such arrests or lawsuits will continue 
to occur, recent deaths at EDM festivals195 and the rising popularity of 
the genre196 will likely prompt awareness of the crack house statute 
under which festival promoters may be prosecuted. Although Tebeau is 
not a “major” concert promoter like Live Nation Entertainment,197 his 
conviction should sound the alarm bells for corporate concert promotion 
companies and their sponsors. If the government can make a case, with 
analogous facts to the Tebeau precedent, against promoters who are 
aware of the drug use present at their festivals, it is only a matter of time 
before the major promoters and venue managers are attacked. 
The dangers of “club drugs,” like ecstasy, have been a federal public 
policy concern since the crack house statute was amended in 2003.198 As 
the popularity of EDM continues to evolve, there is good reason to 
believe that the government’s next target for prosecution could be EDM 
concerts,199 in the same manner “raves” were targeted back in 2003.200 
As the profitability of concerts and music festivals continues to grow and 
these event revenues continue to support the music industry, the threat of 
                                                                                                             
192 149 CONG. REC. 9378 (2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
193 See infra Part II-A. 
194 21 U.S.C. § 856(d)(2) (2012). 
195 Sisario & McKinley, Jr., supra note 7 at, A1. 
196 See infra Part II-C. 
197 See infra Part II-A. 
198 See 149 CONG. REC. 1846-49 (2003) (statements of Sen. Biden and Sen. Grassley). 
199 Other musical genres, known for substantial drug use, may also be targeted. See 
infra Part V-B. 
200 See 149 CONG. REC. at 1847-48; see also infra Part III-C. 
2014] MOLLY AND THE CRACK HOUSE STATUTE 123 
 
major promoters and venue managers being arrested and sued, combined 
with the possibility of major sponsors abandoning their interest in live 
music, may have extremely damaging effects on the industry and reverse 
the positive industry trends of the last several years. 
D. The Music Industry Should Lobby on Tebeau’s Behalf. 
As demonstrated, Tebeau’s case is representative of the dangerous 
path that lies ahead for the live music industry.201 It is in the interest of 
the industry, and of the many sectors of the economy that profit from live 
music, to lobby in support of Tebeau’s contentions and to raise 
awareness of the issues at hand. To be successful in their efforts, these 
potential Tebeau supporters should be aware that although Tebeau put 
forth several respectable statutory arguments that can greatly help their 
cause, his conviction was likely justified. 
Because Tebeau allegedly gave his security staff clear permission to 
allow certain types of drug sales at his events,202 it would have been very 
difficult to overturn the conviction under the current version of Section 
856(a)(2). Although Tebeau did not profit from the drug sales directly,203 
he arguably profited indirectly because certain drug dealers, who would 
have likely known about the festival security’s laissez faire attitude 
toward drugs like marijuana, mushrooms, and LSD, likely paid for 
admission to the festival for the specific purpose of selling illegal drugs. 
Tebeau’s best chance to overturn his conviction would have been to 
focus on his arguments that the statute is unconstitutionally vague and 
that its effects are contrary to the statute’s purpose. 
Because a festival promoter or venue manager can be held liable for 
the acts of others who use his property, there is little guidance as to what 
precautions ought to be taken to avoid liability under the statute. While 
the major concert promoters take significantly more safety precautions 
than Tebeau did with regard to drug sales at their events, Tebeau’s 
proponents can argue that, under the statute, the commonplace nature of 
drug use at such events remains problematic. As long as the current 
iteration of the statute remains and the Tebeau precedent stands, the 
shadow of his conviction will loom over concert promoters nationwide 
who surely cannot prevent all drug distribution and use at their events. 
Although Tebeau’s First Amendment argument may appear 
overstated,204 the inevitability of pervasive drug use at many music 
festivals may lead certain promoters and venue managers to abandon 
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specific endeavors for fear of prosecution, with the resultant effect being 
the “chilling” of free speech.205 In the Petition, Tebeau should have 
dedicated more time to this argument and should have provided the 
Supreme Court with the factual background highlighting the substantial 
scope of the statute’s reach. The cumulative effects of a Tebeau 
precedent may very well curb the number of music festivals and concerts 
in certain genres of music for as long as promoters and venue managers 
lack the guidelines necessary to take sufficient precautions to immunize 
themselves against prosecution under the statute. 
Moreover, Tebeau’s proponents should dissect both the 1986 version 
and the 2003 version of the statute and emphasize the reasons and 
purpose for each version’s enactment.206 They should argue, in detail, 
that the goals of the 2003 version are not being realized by the Tebeau 
decision. Just as the 1986 version was meant to address a specific 
problem dealing with crack houses,207 the 2003 version was meant to 
address a specific problem dealing with high instances of ecstasy use 
among young people in the rave scene.208 Congressional intent for both 
of these bills focused on cutting down the instances of drug use, the 
specific drug depending on the time period.209 If legitimate promoters 
and venue managers are attacked under Section 856 and legitimate 
venues are shut down, it is reasonable to surmise that young people will 
seek alternative, illegitimate venues to enjoy their music and to 
potentially use drugs. The more guidance and support the government 
can give to legitimate promoters and venue managers, the more the 
congressional intent of the statute can be realized. 
Lobbyists on Tebeau’s behalf should not underestimate the 
potentially devastating impact on certain local economies that may result 
from the Supreme Court’s decision to let the Eighth Circuit’s holding 
stand. While Tebeau’s festivals took place in rural Missouri,210 host cities 
of major festivals around the nation, which have grown accustomed to 
the jobs and economic boost that such festivals yield,211 may be 
significantly affected if the festivals were substantially scaled back or 
fully shut down. The impact on the national economy could be 
substantial, as the live music industry has come to generate billions of 
dollars per year.212 
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Moreover, as long as the statute is not applied universally,213 and 
only certain promoters are prosecuted under its current form, it leaves 
open the potential judicial discretion that allows a court to twist the 
content of the statute to reach a variety of conclusions in different 
situations. Music industry lobbyists must stress that if Section 856 were 
actually applied universally under the Tebeau rationale, all promoters 
aware of drug use at their festivals could theoretically be prosecuted. 
Based on the realities of the live music culture today and the fact that 
most promoters and venue managers are aware of what is going on, such 
a class of potential convicts would be enormous. 
E. Popular Culture’s Acceptance of Drug Use Is Problematic. 
Clearly, music festivals and concerts need to be made safer, and 
attacking the drug use and drug sales at these events seems to be a 
rational method of achieving such a goal. The 2003 amendment to the 
crack house statute, while primarily aimed at rogue concert promoters,214 
was also an attempt to attack the “club drug” epidemic on a larger 
scale.215 When addressing some of the critics of his bill, Senator Biden 
explained, 
the answer to the problem of drug use at raves is not 
simply to prosecute irresponsible rave promoters and 
those who distribute drugs. There is also a responsibility 
to raise awareness among parents, teachers, students, 
coaches, religious leaders, etc. about the dangers of the 
drugs used and sold at raves.216 
Senator Grassley noted the problematic acceptance of such drug use 
among young people claiming, “[m]any young people perceive Ecstasy 
as harmless.”217 The social and cultural acceptance of Ecstasy has 
arguably increased since the EDM scene emerged from the underground 
to the mainstream. Now, young people are ingesting MDMA at major 
music festivals218 rather than at “underground raves.”219 While the 
statute’s co-founders sought to raise awareness of the dangers of club 
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drugs among “parents, teachers, [and] students,”220 a more concerted 
effort must be made to address the actual festival attendees. It would be 
in the best interest of all involved if the amount of drug use in the live 
music scene were curtailed. In order to do this successfully, upgrading 
standard security measures at concerts and music festivals will likely be 
insufficient. The culture itself needs to change. 
Madonna’s 2012 antics and her decision to title her album 
“MDNA”221 exemplify the popular culture’s acceptance of “club drug” 
use.222 She provides an excellent example of precise behavior that 
musicians should avoid in front of impressionable, young music fans. 
Musicians like Madonna and EDM DJs like Calvin Harris have the 
power and influence to help diminish the acceptance of ecstasy in the 
EDM culture. These artists have the opportunity to highlight the dangers 
of “club drugs” and to encourage their fans to enjoy their music without 
the “aid” of those drugs.  The music industry should give serious 
consideration to a marketing campaign demonizing the use of these drugs 
in a similar fashion to anti-cigarette and drunk driving campaigns that 
have become so prevalent in our society. 
In the same way many famous rappers have been vocal proponents in 
anti-violence campaigns, often expressing such sentiments in their 
songs,223 EDM artists have a real opportunity to make a difference. 
Although such an idealistic and likely all-too-hopeful plan to help shape 
the culture may be unlikely to succeed without the backing of serious 
players in the industry, it just may suffice for a new beginning. However, 
until a plan with similar goals gets moving and has time to yield results, 
drug use will remain rampant, and concert promoters and venue 
managers will consequently remain vulnerable to prosecution. 
F. There is an Inherent Problem With the Current Wording of 
the Statute. 
Tebeau presents a valid argument regarding the unambiguous nature 
of the statute because the statute’s language is clear on its face.224 
Although promoters and venue managers are undoubtedly aware that 
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illegal activities are occurring at certain events, this awareness does not 
mean that they are intentionally making the venue available for that 
purpose as the statute prohibits.225 This begs the question of whether the 
Eighth Circuit’s reading of the statute can be deemed an example of 
excessive judicial discretion. By allowing the “intention” requirement of 
the statute to be substituted by third parties, the precise wording of the 
statute appears to be ultimately ignored. 
If the goal of the statute is to curb drug use and drug sales,226 then 
the repercussions for violating the statute should be designed to achieve 
that purpose. Punishing promoters and venue managers for activities that 
will inevitably occur at such events hardly accomplishes that goal. As the 
recent deaths at music festivals have shown, the current version of the 
statute is doing little, if anything, to keep festival patrons from using 
dangerous drugs. The focus of the concert promoters and venue 
managers should be on curtailing the drug use and drug sales at these 
festivals, and the statute needs to help facilitate such efforts. Searches by 
security, removal of overly intoxicated patrons, and medical aid stations 
are all necessities that the current version of the statute fails to address. 
Rather than being used merely to prosecute concert promoters and 
venue managers, the statute should provide guidelines for these actors to 
appropriately curb the drug use and drug sales at their events. As written, 
the statute provides a blanket provision that gives no such specifications. 
Until the current version is amended, the state interest of curbing drug 
use is not being achieved, and promoters are exposed to arbitrary 
prosecution. If courts are attributing the statutory “intention” requirement 
to third parties, an additional legislative provision to the statute is 
necessary to prevent inequitable application. 
G. The Best Solution Is to Amend the Statute, Again. 
In order to address all of these issues in a permanent and substantial 
fashion, a simple reversal of the Tebeau decision by the Supreme Court 
may not have sufficed. If the Court had taken the case and issued an 
opinion, concert promoters would likely still have little guidance about 
how to avoid liability while simultaneously providing the safest possible 
environment for their patrons. To avoid such a situation, Congress should 
consider another amendment to the crack house statute.227 In the same 
fashion that the 2003 amendment sought to address a pressing issue at 
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the time,228 a 2014 amendment to the statute could address the dilemma 
that has presented itself today. My proposed amendment to Section 856 
(a)(2) would make it illegal to: 
[M]anage or control any place . . . and knowingly and 
intentionally . . . make available for use . . . the place for 
the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing, 
distributing, or using a controlled substance229 [if the 
actor does not take reasonable precautions (1) to 
prevent these activities and (2) to provide necessary 
health and safety measures for patrons]. 
Such a “reasonableness” test allows for different levels of 
precautions to be taken at different types of events. For example, EDM 
concerts with teenage and young adult fans will likely require more 
health and safety precautions than a jazz concert with an older patronage. 
A balancing test would encourage courts to issue judgments based on the 
necessities demanded by a particular genre of music, the location city, 
the particular venue, those in attendance, and the time of year.  Outdoor 
festivals like Electric Zoo, in the heat of a New York summer, will 
inevitably require more precautions than an indoor, air-conditioned 
venue. Although this suggestion appears initially vague in and of itself, 
and may be susceptible to the same analogous possibility of judicial 
discretion that this Note has previously critiqued,230 such an amendment 
would, at the least, give concert promoters some sort of standard by 
which they can conduct their affairs. A fact-specific inquiry is justified 
due to the virtually unlimited number of scenarios that can occur. 
Courts will be able to consider several factors under the new test. 
Were there enough law enforcement personnel on site or nearby? What 
instructions were given to venue security? Were security personnel 
targeting all types of drug use and drug sales, or were they being 
selective? Could security reasonably eliminate all drug use, or did they 
do the best they could under the circumstances? Were enough medical 
precautions taken to ensure the safety of patrons? Were overtly 
intoxicated individuals removed and given adequate medical attention? 
Were there enough water stations? 
All of these factors need to be addressed in order to achieve the state 
interests of curbing drug use and drug sales at these events and protecting 
the wellbeing and the safety of concert patrons.231 While such an 
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amendment would help to protect festival promoters and venue managers 
from arbitrary prosecution, it would not diminish the central purpose of 
Section 856, which is to combat the problematic drug use of the day and 
the related dangers.232 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The current version of Section 856 (a)(2) reaches an unreasonably 
large class of people, namely concert promoters and venue managers, 
who are left with little guidance about how to avoid liability when 
hosting a music event. A second amendment to the statute, adding a 
reasonableness test, would address Tebeau’s textual, due process, and 
First Amendment concerns, while maintaining the statute’s core purpose. 
Just as the 2003 amendment was passed to address a public policy 
concern of the day, this second amendment is needed to address a 
modern substantial policy concern.233 As the statute currently stands, 
Tebeau’s conviction was likely justified. However, as long as the 
intention element in Section 856 (a)(2) can be transferred from third 
parties to the defendant in crack house statute cases, concert promoters 
and venue managers around the country are in danger of being 
prosecuted for merely being passively aware of the drug use at their 
events. 
To protect promoters and venue owners, to save the industry, and to 
protect the health and safety of music festival patrons, Congress needs to 
fix these statutory problems. Although the Supreme Court would have 
been wise to take the Tebeau case in order to address these concerns, 
Congress would save significant time and unnecessary litigation costs for 
the government, and for countless future defendants, by passing a new 
bill as soon as possible. Such a change is necessary for the future of the 
music industry and the national economy as a whole, as billions of 
dollars are at stake. For live music’s sake and for the sake of the music 
industry at large, the crack house statute needs to be amended, again. 
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